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ABSTRACT

Phase 1 of the task force gathered information on the disruptions in student education that are caused by the schools. Phase 2 examined what can be done to keep students in school, particularly those students who do not fit the system. The present investigation describes the costs to the state and to the individual that derive from students dropping out of school, being expelled, being suspended, and being retained in grade. Losses are described in two categories, those related directly to costs of operating Florida's schools and those derived from disproportionate use of social services by undereducated citizens. In addition to the economic analysis, interviews were conducted with out-of-school youth and with teachers. Data were also examined to determine if an optimum-size school exists that has a lower rate of school disruption than other sizes. A series of recommendations are offered, tables of data are presented, and an outline of a plan for developing and evaluating an instructional program for the socially maladjusted is included. (Author/IRT)

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

The Governor's Task Force on Disrupted Youth

PHASE III

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THE COSTS OF EDUCATIONAL DISRUPTION

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1976

THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DISRUPTIVE YOUTH

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FOREWORD

by

Dr. Claud Anderson
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"A Case of Deficit Financing"

Since World War II, American society has moved rapidly into a "no deposit, no return" kind of society, not simply with store wrappings and containers, but also in our philosophy toward our young. Prior to the war, children were taught to share and care. Schools permitted children to dream of faraway places, while preparing to one day be the President. They learned at an early age the weight of family responsibility and the role of parenthood. Parents in turn valued their children, with a philosophy of the more the merrier, and accepted their children as a 'poor family's social security, a comfort in their old age'. Families worked, played and stayed together.

In recent years we have witnessed a massive discarding of students from our school systems. Consequently, I am firmly convinced that the "human capital" philosophy needs to be revisited. Suspending students, particularly minority children, from schools is a study in "deficit financing". No longer does it appear that our society is committed to the belief that the return on our investment in people is greater than the return on other forms of investments. Conservative budgetary cuts and fiscal management techniques do not reflect humanitarian concerns; people and service oriented programs are the first to feel the blade at both the national and state levels. Similarly, schools eliminate student services and strive to return to the 'basics'.

While Wall Street averages and the Gross National Product fluctuations are based on *marketable goods* and *commercial* resources, our children are our greatest natural resource and their education is our greatest economic commodity. So, why are we annually excluding millions of students from our public school systems, which destines them to years on the welfare and criminal rolls? Banks advertise interest rates and returns on investments, but what is the compounded return on a child denied an education? When the "total investment in the individual is the total investment of the society" what better investment is there than the education of "human capital" . . . a child?

The charge to the Governor's Task Force on Disrupted Youth, in undertaking this third and final phase, was to study and equate the financial relationship between a student's lack or denial of an education and his general productivity. It is my firm conviction that suspending and expelling children from school is not only disruptive and bankruptive to the child but also disruptive and bankruptive to the school and broader society. This massive waste of human potential is incomprehensible. The benefits of an education to both the individual and society are total, and beyond divisibility.

Consequently, what have we wrought when we save a little educational time and effort but lose the future minds of mankind?

DISRUPTIVE YOUTH: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

No one would doubt that a state or nation's greatest asset is a continuous supply of young people who are **ready** to move into its work force and into its leadership positions. In Florida—in the United States—we depend largely on public schools to prepare our children and teenagers for citizenship duties and for service in a fantastically complex and versatile work force.

It has become commonplace for us to think of twelve years of education at public expense as every citizen's right. Evidence of the extent of our commitment to public schooling is the fact that, next to National defense, Americans spend more tax money on education than any single public enterprise.

Consequently, it is almost absurd to think that we would allow conditions to develop in our educational system **which threaten to strangle this constant source of trained manpower** that we routinely take for granted. **It is equally unreasonable** to expect taxpayers to allow conditions which foster the **financial bankruptcy** of our educational enterprise.

Yet, it is happening. **Disruption** in public schools (particularly secondary schools) is increasing rapidly to the point where critical losses of human talent and enormous waste of financial resources can **no longer be officially tolerated or underestimated.**

Many interested citizens and parents already know something of these relatively new and dangerous challenges which schools face. The vast majority, however, are only just beginning to ask--How do we know that a serious problem exists in our schools today? There are many indications of disruption, of course, but only until very recently has there been any systematic attempt to gain access to required data. The **drop-out** problem has traditionally received probably the most attention. A recent national report (Children's Defense Fund, 1974), for example, determined from 1970 U.S. Bureau of the Census data that approximately **two million children** between the ages of 7 and 17 were not enrolled in school. The same report further revealed, moreover, that for some states the percentage of children between 16 and 17 years of age who are out of school was as high as 15 percent, and for some census tracts (usually involving high minority ratios) the out-of-school rate reached 60-75 percent.

Are all of these children out of school by choice (student and/or parental)? The Children's Defense Fund report indicates that many "drop-outs" were first **excluded** from attending school because of subtle school and societal policies which allow exceptions to compulsory attendance regulations. The above report turned up over 30 ways that schools can legally exclude certain "undesirable" students.

Children may be simply "thrown out" of school. **Expulsions** frequently do occur for valid reasons; but increasingly there are accounts of blatantly **arbitrary** expulsion decisions, expulsions linked to **racial or social status discrimination,** or expulsions related in some way to **handicapping conditions. Suspensions** from school are potentially (if not already) an even more disturbing indication of disruption in schools. For example, the previously mentioned report by the Children's Defense Fund (1974) revealed that during 1972-73 five states (Arkansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina) reported to the Office of Civil Rights a total of 152,904 suspensions.* **During that same year, Florida alone reported almost 79,000 suspensions.** Until very recently, these kind of statistics were not even available to state and national education officials—much less available to ordinary citizens. Regardless of information availability, however, this massive suspension phenomenon is, in effect, an admission that schools cannot (or will not) deal effectively with certain children.

Juvenile crime is perhaps the most obvious indication that schools are not solving problems of student disruption. It is now estimated that over 60 percent of all criminal acts are performed by youngsters of school age. Aside from any estimate of long-range manpower and economic losses due to inadequate education, crime immediately faces us with rapidly increasing police costs, court costs, prison costs, property losses, and security costs—all largely due to the fact that children who are supposed to be in an educational environment **are not there.**

The problems associated with children being out of school are so severe that in 1972 the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity commissioned Henry M. Levin to prepare an estimate of the **national costs of inadequate education.** Dr. Levin found that what many had suspected and feared was actually happening—the nation was experiencing tremendous financial losses. For example, males between 25 and 34 years of age who had not attained high

* These data represent only a partial account of disruption, since many school systems within the five states failed to report suspensions.

school completion in 1969 were expected to cost the nation $237 billion in personal lifetime income and $71 billion in lost tax revenues. To have provided a minimum of high school completion for this group would have cost approximately $40 billion. These figures translate roughly to a $200 billion personal income advantage, and a $30 billion tax advantage—**if a high school completion program had been accomplished.**

Unfortunately, income and tax revenue losses are only part of the problem. Undereducated citizens are far less capable (as a group) of coping with the everyday demands of living in a complex society. Consequently, we have been spending, according to the Levin report, approximately **three billion** a year for welfare payments to inadequately educated persons and their families, and have been losing **another three billion** in criminal activities related to undereducation. Other costs related to inadequate education are more difficult to assess—such as reduced political activity, increased probability of disease, and the fact that children of undereducated persons are, themselves, less likely to receive an adequate education.

Understandably, national reports frequently seem somewhat removed from immediate local or regional conditions. Therefore, in Florida the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice funded a Task Force to begin an investigation of disruption in Florida schools. During the spring and summer of 1973, the Task Force prepared Phase I of its report. The first order of business was to find out exactly who the disruptive students were—not names of course—but general sets of characteristics. In other words, can we predict who is likely to be characterized as disruptive in school?

The Phase I report emphatically emphasized that **any student can cause disruption.** However, researchers began to see an unmistakable pattern regarding students **most likely** to be involved in disruptive activities. For example, if a student is male, black, has a low sixth grade achievement score, a low overall grade point average, a low verbal aptitude score, and has not been referred for psychological services, then he is likely to either drop out of school, be suspended or expelled from school, or be otherwise classified as a disruptive student.

The above information from the Phase I report suggests an interesting question—Is it the case that a large, but select group of students are systematically disrupting Florida schools, or is it possible that **Florida schools are systematically and selectively disrupting the educational lives of thousands of their students?** In the latter situation we are obviously talking not about **disruptive** students, but

disrupted students. In Florida, for example, the ratio of black suspensions to white suspensions is 44 percent to 52 percent—yet, the actual ratio of blacks to whites within the state is 23 percent and 77 percent respectively. Interestingly the discrimination idea (i.e., that schools disrupt certain types of students) fits with information provided from national reports (e.g., the Levin report and the Children's Defense Fund report) previously mentioned.

One interesting question concerns the reasons why we have not seen these school related problems earlier. The Florida report (Phase I) indicates simply that information has not been available—except perhaps within individual schools. And in many schools there were (until very recently, and as required by law) no records indicating, for example, the numbers and reasons for suspensions and other disruptions of normal school routine. In most schools researchers were unable to determine the rate at which specific teachers recommended students for suspension. Where this information was available, **it was not unusual to find that four or five teachers within a school were recommending as many as 80 percent of the total suspensions for that school.** These data raise the obvious question—Why are extreme disciplinary measures a popular strategy for some teachers and not for others? Why do some schools suspend and expel students at a higher rate than others? These questions have not yet been answered in Florida.

However, the Phase I investigation did accumulate enough information to generate several preliminary recommendations. A most obvious immediate need was to standardize record keeping procedures across the state. A second concern was to push for student rights legislation—how can we ensure, for example, that students are not forced out of school without a proper investigation? Another suggestion called for greater availability of psychological services. And as is usually the case, we were advised to spend more money to study school disruption, and to generate and implement solutions.

What are some possible solutions to the problems described in Phase I of the Florida report on disruption in public schools? This was the primary question addressed by Phase II of Florida's school investigation. Almost immediately the Task Force was faced with the problem of Florida's "throw away" attitude toward students—particularly those who are poor and of minority racial status. How, for example, can schools solve the problem of student unrest when **schools themselves are a significant part of the problem? We know** that in spite of Florida's continuing efforts to improve its educational system, at least one third of the students entering ninth grade classes during the 1971-72 school year failed

to graduate from the twelfth grade at the end of school year 1973-74. In addition to these students who "voluntarily" dropped out of school, or were permanently expelled, vast numbers of the remaining students were temporarily suspended for periods ranging from one to twenty days. **During 1973-74, for example, over 80,000 suspensions (across all grades) were reported in Florida.** Strangely it appears that as schools continue to try to cope with students whose needs are obviously not being met, the "push-out" phenomenon increases. These school initiated losses provide a discouraging indication of potential future educational conditions. Adult education programs, for example, are rapidly becoming an important source (admittedly at higher expense) for high school completion in this state. In fact, a somewhat facetious analysis (Aker, 1974) concluded that since the rate of drop-out (or push-out) from Florida schools is increasing faster than the increase in enrollment, eventually there will be no children left in school at all!

How can we keep children in school? Clearly we cannot force them to stay. Already attention has been focused on the general similarities between secondary schools and prisons (Haney & Zimbardo, 1975). And quite honestly, humans may see any institution as a prison if it seriously restricts a person's freedom by forcing him or her into regulated and routine modes of behavior and thought. Haney and Zimbardo ask, for example, is it necessary that educational facilities and programs be totally geared for security, surveillance and efficiency. The usual result is that by high school age most students are content to obey without question—the others are easily dealt with through our efficient suspension and expulsion policies.

Phase II of the Florida report, therefore, puts the issue squarely to the public schools—they can no longer afford to continue (or to become involved) as a possible major contributor to school disruption. This means that the "push-out" phenomenon must cease—**schools must develop alternatives to the observed "throw away" attitude toward students who do not immediately "fit" the system.** In most cases alternative programs will first need to deal with basic biological and social needs which have not been met. For children whose only institutional affiliation is the public school, isolation (from school) is clearly not the answer—particularly when nothing else is put in its place. Common sense dictates that at least one ingredient to alternative programming is attention to "survival" skills—that is, how can a student best employ his **strengths** in a tightly regulated and complex social and economic system. Obviously, any such program

would involve curriculum modifications (and concessions), greater availability of social and psychological services, and a variety of teacher and administrative improvements.

What about public support for educational change? Are schools really expected to solve their problems, or is disruption simply one of the accepted costs of education? During the period 1969-73, the Gallup Poll conducted annual surveys of the public's reaction to contemporary public education. The public placed school discipline as its priority school concern each year. Yet, 78 percent of the respondents would not permit "disinterested" students to disenroll from school. Clearly, the "owners" of the public schools recognize a problem and feel the schools can do something about it. When asked if they would support a tax increase for the public schools, more than half of the Gallup respondents answered affirmatively each year. **These responses indicate that citizens do expect schools to undertake the major role in solving disruption among youth, and apparently they are willing to absorb the additional costs.** An indication of what the public is willing to do when political leadership is provided is demonstrated by its support of such War-on-Poverty devices as the Job Corps, the annual per capita costs of which often exceeded those of sending a student to Harvard University.

Given that schools can and will respond affirmatively to public concern, what are some immediate guidelines for change? The Governor's Task Force in Florida suggested **first** that schools make an immediate effort to substitute **corrective** discipline for punitive disciplinary procedures (e.g., suspension, expulsion). Such changes would necessarily involve a more intensive **counseling** effort, the use of community skills (e.g., youth advocacy programs), and more effective use of facilities such as "half-way" houses. **Secondly,** communication problems involving parents, teachers and administrators should receive priority attention. **Third,** parents are a virtually untapped resource in today's schools—we can no longer afford to ignore this potentially valuable source of aid. And **finally,** we need to consider the rights of students. If we belive that all citizens should receive a basically sound and complete education, then we need to **remove** (or at least seriously restrict) the choice which schools have traditionally had (and recently exercised) in deciding who may be allowed a complete and uninterrupted tenure in school.

The Children's Defense Fund (CDF) has recently taken an even stronger stance regarding our national attitude toward education. CDF Project Director Marian Wright Edelman remarks, for example, that **"we must combat the myth**

that we are a child-centered society" (1975, p. 57). The CDF report "Children Out of School in America" (1974) indicates, for example, that children are systematically excluded from school because of race, poverty, language differences, and various handicapping conditions. How can this happen? Can schools decide who does and who does not receive an education? The report insists that an immediate priority should be to challenge the school's monopoly in deciding to serve only **some** children and not others. In this regard several national and local recommendations were offered. On a national level the CDF suggests that the U.S. Senate conduct special hearings on school exclusion policies. The hearings would be held in selected locations throughout the country and would attend particularly to attendance barriers, discipline policies, and potentially damaging classification procedures. Additionally, the HEW Office for Civil Rights should provide specific guidelines for ending racial disproportionality in the administration of educationally damaging discipline procedures—and OCR should immediately begin on-site compliance reviews. At the same time, the OCR needs to increase technical assistance (to the schools) for data collection and reporting activities. All of these measures should be accompanied by tougher enforcement of existing requirements.

Locally, the CDF suggests that schools immediately **stop** suspension and expulsion of children from school—at least as a discipline measure. These alternatives should not be available (except in extreme cases) to schools. Further, **state school officials** should provide model codes for discipline, and they should provide the technical assistance needed to achieve those conditions. Again, it is suggested that parents be involved to a greater extent, particularly regarding important decisions involving their children. Parents should be more actively involved, for example, in the selection of key administrative personnel such as principals. Closer attention to teacher training is suggested, with special emphasis on techniques to attain and maintain discipline. However, without a massive attack on racial discrimination the effectiveness of any innovation will be substantially limited.

How likely is it that suggested innovations will be accomplished (even attempted) in the near future? It is interesting to note that the Children's Defense Fund report was extremely **realistic in anticipating bureaucratic resistance to concerns about disruption in schools.** Suggestions for change, the report says, will be met with a variety of excuses ranging from complete denial that a problem exists, to admission of the problem but denial that schools are responsible. In any

event, the final (and perhaps most serious) excuse will be that **money is not available** to fund programs for ending school disruption.

This report examines the money problem—not the cost of solving the problem but **the costs of not solving the problem. This is Phase III of the Florida Task Force report on school disruption.** The two previous reports have isolated the children who disrupt (or are disrupted), and have identified some school policies/attitudes which contribute to the problem. **The present study examines the costs to individuals, and the state-supported costs, of less than full time school attendance and less than 12th grade completion.** Results will provide at least a careful estimate of the total dollar loss experienced by Florida citizens and taxpayers as the result of children being out of school. **A second portion of the study seeks to isolate optimum school size/funding arrangements within the Florida public school system.** While previous research has argued convincingly that larger schools offer more comprehensive programs at less cost, the economies of scale concept has not been tested with regard to success in keeping children in school. Collectively, the results of this investigation are expected to (1) inform interested citizens of the tremendous costs involved in public school disruption, and (2) to assist policy makers in their effort to balance the substantial costs of alternative educational programs against the greater costs of failing to take immediate action against school disruption.

METHODOLOGY

The present investigation describes costs to the state (public) and costs to individuals (private) which derive from students (1) dropping out of school; (2) being expelled from school; (3) being suspended from school; and (4) being retained in grade. The major thrust of this report is to present an estimate of the total dollar loss incurred by the State of Florida during 1973-74 as the result of the above categories of disturbance in school attendance. Losses are described in two categories,those related directly to costs of operating Florida's schools, and those derived from disproportionate use of social services by undereducated citizens.

Financial benefits, both public and private, can also be attributed to students out of school (and working) instead of in school (and immediately unproductive). *Cost/benefit methodology* computes these measurable benefits as percentages of the long-range costs resulting from inadequate education.

In addition to the purely economic aspects of school disruption, we were also interested in obtaining a more personal view of problems from students and teachers. Consequently, interviewers were sent into randomly selected (but demographically representative) schools across Florida. With regard to students physically out of school, the researchers conducted interviews in poolrooms, bars, on street corners, at youth centers, in private homes, and in other places that were reported to us as having a high concentration of drop-outs. Since the questions were primarily open-ended, the results of this phase of the investigation are not easily quantifiable. Therefore, an attempt will be made to place traditional cost data into a more psychological perspective by simply reporting uncensored student and teacher comments at the bottom of each page within the results section.

Finally, we examined financial, suspension and retention data from approximately 200 secondary schools in Florida for evidence of "economies of scale"—for example, do certain optimum size schools have lower rates of school disruption than others?

Statewide Educational Costs/Benefits

Educational dollar losses occur whenever state funds continue to be allocated for students no longer in school Thus, students in the following three categories may earn state funds for their schools, but **not** receive the subsequent school services:

1. **Drop-outs** – Florida Department of Education estimates (see Appendix

A) show that 26,961 students dropped out of school during 1973-74. Since enrollment counts are made only twice a year (October and February), students who leave school after the October count and after the February count are carried (financially) as present until the **next** counting period. These students still continue to draw tax dollars for their education, but do *not* receive school services.

2. **Expulsions** – During 1973-74, a total of 612 students were expelled from Florida schools for a period of 20 or more consecutive days. An estimate of the school funds generated for these students **while they are prohibited from attending school** further contributes to the total dollar loss experienced in Florida.
3. **Suspensions** – 56,899 students were temporarily suspended (average 6.2 days) from Florida schools during 1973-74. Again, these students generated daily funds for which no services were received.

Students may generate additional educational costs without actually leaving school. Students retained in grade, for example, generally **repeat** much of the work for which an entire year's funding was allocated. For the purpose of this analysis, each of the 38,140 students retained in grade for 1973-74 are counted as a full loss for that year. Finally, the Florida Education Finance Program in effect during school year 1973-74 provided for the needs of several classes of students, distinctive from the needs of the "normal" student. Among these classes was one for the student whose demeanor in the school was such as to detract from his education or that of others, and whose conduct did not fall within another class of distinctive need. During school year 1973-74, 24 school systems reported expending funds in this category on 1,436.15 Full-Time Equivalent students. Analysis of the expenditure revealed:

School Direct Expenses (or $1,915.85 per FTE)	$2,599,542.00
School Indirect Expenses (or $251.78 per FTE)	368,301.00
District Indirect Expenses (or $37.92 per FTE)	612,845.00

Appendix B contains complete data.

Social Service Costs

Not all social service costs are related to educational attainment, of course. However, several major public welfare programs in Florida do become highly involved with undereducated recipients. The following seven programs provided 1973-74 direct cost figures for services rendered undereducated clients:

Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Medical Assistance Payments
Youth Services Program
Corrections Program
Mental Health Program
Unemployment Insurance Payments
Vocational Rehabilitation

The summary of costs associated with above programs are further inflated by indirect public costs derived from the potential, but uncollected, tax payments of inmates and patients in training schools, mental institutions, and correctional institutions. Also, indirect **private** costs were calculated from the estimated earnings lost by the above inmates and patients during 1973-74.

A combined analysis of **public and private costs of educational and social service programs** reveals the total dollar loss to Florida taxpayers. Comparison of **cost figures** to the measurable benefits of placing students into early job situations is expected to have an impact on subsequent decisions related to funding of alternative school programs.

Economies of Scale

A stratified (according to important demographic variables) random sampling of over 200 secondary schools from 13 Florida school systems ensured a sufficiently large (36 percent of the total secondary schools) and representative sample for this portion of investigation. Appendix C gives a breakdown of the 203 schools by size, per capita dollar expenditures, and student disruption (e.g., retention, suspension) rates. Data from which these averages were taken were examined for indication of relationships (correlations) between either size or money spent, and the disruption measures. Large correlations between these variables would be indicative of particularly successful or unsuccessful size/funding arrangements.

RESULTS

OUTLINE

Direct educational losses (Florida – 1973-74)	
Dropouts	5.5 million dollars
Expulsions	.1 million dollars
Suspensions	36.1 million dollars
Retentions	1.8 million dollars
Social Service costs attributed to interrupted education	69.7 million dollars

Direct Loss of Educational Time

Florida taxpayers pay for children who are not in school. Table 1 gives the estimated student time lost through various disruptions in secondary school activity as reflected in selected reports of the school system superintendents of education and the Florida State Department of Education. Readers should note that data shown in Table 1 are actually conservative estimates of the total disruption in Florida schools since only secondary school figures are presented.

Table 1

Estimated Loss of Secondary Student Time (in School Year Equivalents) Due to Disruption

Category	Number of Students	Student Year Equivalents
Dropout	26,961	5,790.3
Expulsion	612	104.0
Suspension	56,899	1,959.9
Retention	38,140	38,140.0
	TOTAL	45,994.2

Dropout rate. A total of 26,961 students dropped out of Florida schools during 1973-74. These students represented 7 percent of the statewide enrollment in grades 10-12 and 3.4 percent of the total enrollment in grades 7-12. Applying the dropout rate in a cost analysis required an assumption regarding the occurrence of leaving school. It was estimated that one-third of the dropouts occurred during the first half of the school year. Further, the rate of leaving during each month of each half of the year was equal to the other months of that half of the year. Thus, an estimated 8,937 dropouts occurred during the first half of the school year. Each month 1,797.4 students voluntarily discontinued their schooling. Using this method, 3,595 students were estimated to have left the schools prior to the first FTE count period in October 1973. However, the schools earned financial credit for 5,392 students who discontinued membership after the counting period. Using the same method, the schools earned financial credit for 17,974 students who were estimated to have dropped out after the February 1974 FTE count period. Each of the 23,366 students, then, generated an average of 44.6 funded school days (from examination of 1973-74 school calendar). Based on a 180 day school calendar, these wasted (but funded) days amounted to the total of 5,790.3 student **years** shown in Table 1.

Expulsion rate. Each expelled student was estimated to have generated funds for approximately one-sixth of the 180-day school year. The 712 expulsions in Florida during 1973-74, thus generated 104 student years of funded (but unused) school time.

Suspensions. The average length of suspensions in Florida during 1973-74 was 6.2 days. Therefore, simply multiplying the total of 56,899 suspended students (Table 1) by 6.2 and then dividing by the 180 days in a typical school year, yields 1,959.9 school **years** lost due to the practice of suspension.

Retentions. Retentions were considered a total financial loss to Florida, since the State must pay for the child to repeat the same studies a second year. Although there is discussion among educators concerning the benefits to the student in repeating a grade, the student also appears to lose economically, since

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What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Feeling that school is useless to them and that they can do better on the outside." (Age 14, 9th grade)

he generally must remain in school an additional year and forego another year's earnings. A total of 38,140 students were retained in grade during the 1973-74 school year—Florida taxpayers thus pay for an additional 38,140 student years.

Public Costs of Wasted Educational Time

The public costs of school disruption were derived by simply multiplying the student years lost through dropouts, expulsions, suspensions, and retentions by the 1973-74 full-time equivalent cost per pupil. The 1973-74 expense per full-time equivalent pupil (derived from school operations and maintenance costs) was $945.88. Although there is some argument for including them, capital outlay and debt service expenditures have been excluded from the computation as not directly germane to examination of the economics of educational disruption. Multiplying the 45,994.2 student years by $945.88, thus gives an estimated direct public loss of $43,504,993 for school year 1973-74.

Public Benefit Derived from Early School Leavers

The public benefit obtained from disrupted education takes the form of taxes paid by the new worker. An estimated one-third of the student loss occurred in the first half of the year, with the remainder leaving during the second half. The unemployment rate for this age group during 1973-74 was 19.4 percent. Estimated average federal and state tax payments during the period for an unmarried person were computed at $402 (Internal Revenue Service, 1973;1974). It was assumed that those leaving school during the first half would not have paid income tax because of insufficient income in 1973. Those leaving in 1974 would have paid all taxes. Final computations revealed, therefore, that an estimated 6,333,840 in taxes were paid by early school leavers into the state and federal treasuries.

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Because a lot of them don't know how important a good education is for their future. Most dropouts are in trouble with the police." (Age 16, 12th grade)

Private Costs of Incomplete Education

The private costs of educational disruption are those borne by the student and his family. The major cost to the individual was foregone earning capability. The Florida Employment Service reported that the average wage-earner's income for fiscal year 1973-74 was $8,039. The Bureau of the census estimated that during 1973, persons 18 to 24 years of age who had completed high school but had not enrolled in college earned $7,231 on the average. Those who had completed three or fewer years of high school earned $6,446. Thus, the minimum foregone earning capability was estimated to be the difference between the two averages supplied by the Census Study—$785. The maximum difference was estimated to be the difference between the lower census figure and the Florida Employment Service average, or $1,593. For ease of computation, an average loss was estimated to be $1,189 for the year. Although higher than the national differential, the latter reflects higher wages paid in Florida. Additionally, it was estimated that each student spent $10 for pencils, paper, and other miscellaneous required items that year. The private costs were then computed as $54,687,103 foregone earning capability plus $459.942 miscellaneous fees expended, totaling $55,147,045.

Private Benefits of Leaving School Early

The private benefit of school disruption is estimated by computing the estimated total wage to be earned per month during the study year by the early school leavers—that is, the estimated wage for less than high school graduates discounted by the estimated unemployment rate experienced during 1973-74. Early school leavers totaling 27,573 were reduced 19.4 percent for unemployment and then factored to obtain the estimated number of months worked during the period in total. The expected monthly wage for the group was $537. The

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What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"They have caused trouble so much and wasted time until they get so far behind and they get discouraged because they can't catch up and quit." (Age 15, 10th grade)

estimated benefit, $54,000,740, must then be reduced by anticipated tax payments of $6,333,840. The private benefit of early school leaving is estimated to have been $47,766,900.

In summary, the inadequately educated youth both paid for his release from school (in terms of future income restriction) and received a benefit (immediate earnings) from his new-found time. The State of Florida also paid and benefitted—the relationship between these costs and benefits will be examined in a later section of this report. Direct educational and private costs and benefits, however, are not the only economic factors of interest in the area of school disruption. The following discussion will provide an estimate of the economic impact of educational disruption on public social services.

Social Service Costs and Benefits

The largest executive department in Florida state government is the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Although services span human needs from birth to death, present examination of the Department's activities will be limited to financial summations of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medical Payments, Vocational Rehabilitation, Corrections, and Youth Services programs. The Unemployment Compensation program, administered by the State Department of Commerce, will also be analyzed. The activities represent the major welfare programs available to those families and individuals whose incomes fall below a minimal level or who fall into other specific categories of need. Information on other programs administered by state agencies has not been inlcuded for three reasons: (1) because data was not available concerning the educational level of clients; (2) because the funds administered by the agency are derived solely from Federal sources and eligibility was based on no education-related characteristics; (3) because the agency declined to provide data.

Not all welfare costs are related to educational attainment. Among these are,

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What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Because they can't cope with the everyday problems and have never really learned the right way to study, so they can't keep up with the overall student body." (Male, age 15, 11th grade)

for example, Old Age and Survivors' Insurance, popularly known as Social Security payments. Such programs, it may be argued, do depend on education to some degree, but that dependence is difficult to assess and is only minimally recognized in the scale of monthly payments to recipients. Such programs have been disregarded in the present analysis.

Family Service and Medical Payments. The Division of Family Services served 85,639 heads of families through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC) during January 1973. Of these, 73.7 percent had less than a high school education. During Fiscal Year 1973-74, cash payments totaling $112,154,327 were paid under the AFDC program. An estimated $82,657,739 was paid to undereducated clients. An additional $56,768,331 was paid to undereducated Medical Assistance Payments recipients.

Youth Services. The State of Florida expended a total of $28,605,380 for Division of Youth Services purposes during Fiscal Year 1973-74. Included were costs of training school operations, group treatments, parole and probation costs, as well as others. Although no inference may be drawn concerning the average daily training school population of 1083 in relation to the 1973-74 early school leavers discussed elsewhere in this report, it is interesting to note that even after release from the training schools, 76 percent did not return to public school. It may be estimated that foregone earnings for the training school incumbents, using the highest age (16 to 17 years), the unemployment rate for fiscal year 1973-74 of 19.4 percent, and adjusting the annual wage downward (-$2000) for age and work experience and as a penalty to the group because of training school history, will total 1083-210 x ($8039-2000) = $5,272,047. It may further be estimated that $350,946 in foregone sales and other taxes were lost as well.

Corrections. Inmate service costs at Florida Correctional institutions averaged $12.50 per day. The Youthful Offender population (under age 25) averaged 11,326, of whom 84 percent did not have a high school diploma. In all, $42,812,280 was spent for undereducated inmates. Median length of sentence for

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What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Faculty and people don't understand and try to get involved with the problem student. People just don't take the time to get involved." (Former runaway dropout, age 15, 9th grade)

the group was three years. Foregone income for the group, a private cost, may be estimated by annualizing the average weekly wage less a pro-rata share of unemployment loss using the highest reported rate (8.6 percent) for 20 to 24 year old males. The highest rate was selected as an estimated employment penalty for prior criminal activity, based on community biases. Thus, an estimated 9,514 inmates, less 818 who would be unemployed, lost $69,904,144 in foregone earnings during Fiscal Year 1973-74. It may further be estimated that foregone taxes exceed $4,278,432. More than half (54 percent) had an average I.Q. Three of every four (74 percent) had resided in Florida more than six years.

Mental Health. Florida spent a total of $23.27 per patient day for mental health. The average resident census for 1973-74 was 6,622, of whom 46 percent had not completed high school. A total of $25,517,956 was spent on the undereducated mental health patient population. If that group was not institutionalized, and its employment, earnings, unemployment, and tax-paying history were assumed to be the same as the rest of the population, then an estimated $22,340,576 was lost in foregone earnings and $1,369,728 was lost in foregone taxes.

Employment and Unemployment-Related Cases. The Department of Commerce administers the principal programs encouraging employment in Florida. The main program is Unemployment Insurance. Since persons who have not been employed or who have not been employed for a total of 24 months are not eligible to receive payments or to receive reduced payments under this program, educational preparation levels may be considered to have a minimal effect on demand for program support by youthful workers.

Employment among the less well-educated and for the youthful worker has historically been less readily available than for other classes. During 1973, Florida's unemployment rate for the white 16-19 year age group was 9.8 percent.

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"I think students drop out of school because the traditional, stilted curriculum and ways of running the schools turn them off. The schools try to change students, all students, to conform to the way the school is run rather than being flexible enough to cater to the interests and needs of students with varying interests and aptitudes." (Science teacher, black, male)

Among non-whites 16-19 years of age the unemployment rate was 25.0 percent (*Florida Employment and Unemployment*, 1973, p. 15). The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for the entire state population, in contrast, was 5.2 percent during the study year. The average period of unemployment was 17.25 weeks. The average weekly benefit was $52.11. An indication of unemployment in a class of workers is the number of requests for assistance the class generates with the Florida Employment Service. During the study period, 29.3 percent of the requests for assistance received by the Service came from patrons 22 years of age or younger (Office of Research, May 1975). It should be noted that the lower overall 16-19 year age group unemployment rate was applied to one-third of the disruptive youth total mentioned herein. The non-white rate was applied to the remainder of the group. This proportioning is representative of the generally accepted racial and cultural breakdown of disruptive youth (Edelman, 1974).

Since data are available to the state Employment Service on only its patrons, and since the youthful (ages 16 to 19 years) are generally not qualified to participate or to participate fully in insurance payments, a series of estimates must be made. Assuming that a high of 25 percent and a low of 15 percent of the unemployed youth were eligible for payments, the following estimates may be made:

White unemployed	23,000
Black and other races unemployed	16,000
Total unemployed	39,000
Average number of weeks	x 17.25
Total weeks of unemployment	672,750.00
Average weekly compensation	$52.11
Total expenditure	$35,057,002

Payments to Youth Claimants	
Upper Limit x .25	Lower Limit x .15
$8,764,250	$5,258,550

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—
They just don't care about their future." (Age 14, 9th grade)

Vocational Rehabilitation. During Fiscal Year 1973-74, 15,247 clients were vocationally rehabilitated. Approximately half, 7650 or 50.2 percent had not graduated from high school. The average cost per rehabilitation that year was $1,925. A total of $1,251,250 was spent for undereducated clients.

Social Cost Summary. The costs shown throughout this section are based on estimates as related to educational characteristics of clients. The present summary (Table 2) of social and related costs resulting from inadequate education should be accepted with two **caveats** in mind:

1. Undereducation does not necessarily lead to dependence on social services.
2. Benefactors of social services are not always undereducated.

Table 2
Estimated Social Service Costs Due
to Inadequate Education

Direct Public Costs

Program		Cost Estimate
Aid to Families with Dependent Children		$ 82,657,739
Medical Assistance Payments		56,768,331
Youth Services Program		28,605,380
Corrections Program		42,812,280
Mental Health Program		25,517,956
Unemployment Insurance Payments	high	8,764,250
Unemployment Insurance Payments	low	5,258,550
Vocational Rehabilitation		1,251,250
Total	high	$246,377,186
	low	$242,871,486

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Because school tends to get very boring after a while. There isn't enough breaks throughout the year to keep a student's interest; when we do have vacations they are all globbed together in one month and then that's that for the year. The main problem is boredom." (Student, age 16, 11th grade)

Table 2 (cont'd)

Indirect Public Costs

Foregone tax payments of youths in training schools		$ 350,946
Foregone tax payments of inmates in correctional institutions		4,278,432
Foregone tax payments of patients in mental institutions		1,369,728
	Total	$ 5,999,106

Indirect Private Costs

Foregone earnings of youths in training schools		$ 5,272,047
Foregone earnings of inmates in correctional institutions		69,907,144
Foregone earnings of patients in mental institutions		22,380,576
	Total	$ 97,559,767

The costs described above may be accepted as representing the total social service expenditures for undereducated clients. A question then arises as to what part of the costs may be directly related to inadequate education. Schultz (1962) and Denison (1962) estimated that education's contribution to national personal wealth approximates 20 percent. Zymelman (p. 228, 1973) also refers to the 20 percent rate. Using that estimate, the following may be considered as the cost of

What are they saying?

—What would you change about your school?—

"Counseling for one; they just don't have the—I don't know, I can't say—the background to counsel, they just don't counsel the students right. I don't know if it's immaturity or nothing, but they just can't seem to get through. I know they didn't get through with me and my peer group—they sure wasn't getting through to—you know, they were just saying, well, you're incorrigible; we're just going to send you away for three days and you can come back, you know, that's just the kind of attitude I took towards it. So I think they ought to have better counselors, to reach these kids while they can, before they start really getting into some delinquent acts." (Dropout, age 18)

social services due to inadequate education in Florida:

Direct Public Costs (Mean)		**$244,624,336**
Indirect Public Costs		**5,999,106**
Indirect Private Costs		**97,559,767**
	Total	$348,183,209
		.20
	Estimated New Loss	**$ 69,636,640**

Cost-Deficit Analysis. The private cost of inadequate education was estimated at $55,147,045 and the estimated benefit at $47,766,900. A comparison of benefits to costs indicates a ratio of 1 to 1.15, less than 1 or the desired minimum ratio, which means that the individual is losing slightly more than he gains by leaving school early. However, his decision may be predicated on other factors and therefore, rational to him at the moment.

The public costs of inadequate education has been estimated as $43,504,993 and the public benefit as $6,333,840. A comparison of benefits to costs indicates a ratio of 1:6.87. The state, then is also acting in an irrational fashion economically to, at minimum, not discourage early school leaving.

But what of the other costs of school disruption? The long-term welfare of the individual and the state are affected by the individual's educational level. When the fiscal year 1973-74 social costs of disrupted education are added to the foregoing educational costs for the same period, then significant changes occur in the benefit-cost ratios, as Table 3 reveals. The private benefit-cost ratio previously described is further depressed, falling from 1:1.15 to 1:1.56. The individual's best choice, whether only the economics of education or the total direct and indirect educational and social costs and benefits are considered, is to remain in school. The public benefit-cost ratio changes from that where school management's

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Because they are individuals, they have more character and refuse to be molded in the shaped form that society tries to make us in. Actually, they should be admired. If we had more subjects that would interest everybody (individuals), everyone would be a success." (Former dropout, age 18, 12th grade)

choice may lead to a policy of non-discouragement of early release to one strongly encouraging school continuation for the youth. The ratio changes from 1:6.87 to 1:14.78. Stated in terms of the expected rate of return, Florida may expect to regain its investment in undereducation in fiscal year 1973-74 in approximately 15 years, assuming no change during that time in any of the factors considered.

Table 3

Cost-deficit Analysis Summary of Educational Disruption in Florida Public Secondary Schools with other Related Costs, School Year 1973-74

	Measure (in dollars)	Rate of Return (%)	Benefit/Cost Ratio
Education			
Public:			
Benefit	$ 6,333,840	14.6	1:6.87
Cost	43,504,993		
Private:			
Benefit	47,766,900	86.6	1:1.15
Cost	55,147,045		
Education and Social			
Public:			
Benefit	6,333,840	6.7	1:14.78
Cost	93 528,811		
Private:			
Benefit	47,766,900	63.9	1:1.56
Cost	74,658,999		

What are they saying?

—How do you feel about suspension?—

"Well, in a way I kinda feel that it's kind of a good thing, because it's kind of a way to let a student know that he can't do anything he wants to and get away with it. It's a way of letting him know discipline." (Student, age 18)

Table 3 (cont'd)

	Measure (in dollars)	Rate of Return (%)	Benefit/Cost Ratio
Change if Socially Maladjust Student Funding Fully Implemented			
Public:			
Benefit	56,457,658	34.2	1:2.91
Cost	164,787,359		
Private:			
Benefit	50,123,818	90.8	1:1.10
Cost	55,147,045		

Research limited to the immediate economic impact of school disruption on the participants probably will find little measurable change, as Table 3 shows. But consideration of the entire cost of school disruption as represented by the state's investment during any period reveals the gross economic effort necessary to recover from what may have been a remediable situation earlier. How could the situation have been changed? The Florida Educational Finance Program provided a Socially Maladjusted program budget factor in School Year 1973-74. Average cost per full-time equivalent student was $2493. If all 45,994.2 full-time equivalent disruptive youths subject of this research had been funded under that program, their education would have cost an additional $71,158,553, or a total of $114,663,541. Keeping these potential workers in school would cancel the expected tax benefit of their early entry into the job market. It would also be expected to have an offsetting effect on the social costs of educational disruption of approximately $50,123,818. The ratio then changes from 1 to 1.10. Florida

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"Reasons vary so much from student to student that it would be impossible to answer this question. I often think that **faulty generalizations** are responsible for **unsuccessful** and **expensive** attempts to cope with the dropout problem. I believe that *each set* of circumstances (contributing to a student's dropping out is unique.)" (English teacher, white, female)

could expect to return its increased expenditure in approximately one seventh the time of its current, less expensive, but educationally inadequate, schooling practice.

Lifetime Earnings. This study has been limited to the economic effects of educational disruption during one school year. The study would be incomplete without at least a reference to the expected effects on the individuals who suffered an inadequate education during school year 1973-74. Most available data reveals that the lifetime earnings differential between the high school graduate and non-high school graduate will exceed $93,000 or almost $2,000 per year for the rest of their lives. Florida, in addition, can anticipate paying for social services and also losing the taxes that would have been paid on that lost income. It was previously revealed that taxes paid by the inadequately educated class of 1973-74 were approximately $6.3 million. Table 2 showed public costs to be $93,628,811. Each year for more than half a century, the public treasury is assured that it will receive less and spend more than it would have if public policy had required school authorities to educate Florida's disruptive youth in School Year 1973-74.

The Economies of Scale Hypothesis

Simple correlational analyses failed to reveal any practically meaningful linear relationships between school size (average daily membership) and rates of either suspension ($r = .20$, $df = 201$, $p > .05$) or retention ($r = .15$, $df = 201$, $p > .05$). A variety of school direct and indirect cost figures were similarly unrelated to rates of suspension and retention. **Results, therefore, do not support the hypothesis that there are optimum size schools which experience increased success in avoiding school disruption.**

What are they saying?

—Why do students drop out of school?—

"They see it (dropping out) as the least damaging to their plans, self-concept or something else. They fear failure; they feel they are not learning anything relevant; they want money, status, or success, and school can't fulfill these or other needs." (School psychologist, white, female)

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Statewide Costs/Benefits

Public costs. As mentioned earlier, the first step in determining the cost of disruption was to compile the total amount of student time lost (but paid for by the state) due to dropouts, expulsions, suspensions, and retentions. One straightforward approach is to convert days lost to total student years lost, and then multiply that total by the 1973-74 full-time equivalent expense of $945.88 per pupil. **The total estimated student years lost across the above four categories was 45,994.2 student years. At the rate of $945.88 per pupil year, this represents a dollar loss to Florida of $43,504,993.**

Public benefits. State and federal taxes paid by employed school dropouts and expellees totaled an estimated $6,333,840. Compared to the $43,504,993 lost, these small returns are a poor bargain indeed.

Recommendation 1

There is a need for educational leaders to openly and frontally face the problems of children out of school. Clearly, Florida cannot continue to absorb the economic losses described above. Alternative procedures need to be developed for (1) more exact accounting of children out of school at any given time, (2) more responsive (to enrollment) funding procedures, and (3) more reliable communication between school, district, and state officials regarding immediate local problems. These suggestions do not address the causes of disruption, of course; they derive from the **need for efficiency in simply finding out about disruption.**

Recommendation 2

School finance procedures are apparently **not responsive** to fluctuations in school enrollment. At the present time

schools may choose to discontinue (either temporarily or permanently) the education of selected students without seriously disrupting the flow of state funds into those schools. One suggestion is that if finance laws were rewritten to allow more precise response to changing enrollments, then school officials would have an additional incentive (financial) for keeping students in school and in class.

Recommendation 3

Florida should examine compulsory attendance laws more carefully. No one knows how many students are out of school simply because little effort is made to explain and enforce existing attendance regulations. The previously mentioned report by The Children's Defense Fund (1974) revealed some 35 exceptions or exemptions (across states) to laws related to school attendance. How many exceptions to required attendance are there in Florida?

Recommendation 4

Over 38,000 students were retained in grade during 1973 74. Some were obviously in the best interest of the students. Nevertheless, retentions may not be the most efficient way to deal with learning problems. This "more of the same" philosophy results in tremendous costs to individuals and to taxpayers. Planners at the state level should consider implementation of some requirements that schools document exactly why students are being retained. Such documentation would include evidence of early identification of the learning problem and description of efforts to provide realistic remedial work.

Private Costs/Benefits. The average wage differential (for 1973/74) between individuals with a high school education and those who had not finished high school was estimated at $1,189. This accumulates to a total loss of $55,147,045

for the entire state.

On the other hand, individuals with less than high school completion earned $47,766,900, compared to negligible immediate earnings of counterparts still in school. **The following recommendations address the problems of getting students to forego immediate earnings in order to complete a basic education.**

Recommendation 5

When total private benefits (earnings) of undereducation are compared to total costs (temporary foregone earnings) of obtaining a 12th grade education, students ultimately derive the greatest benefit from remaining in school. Obviously, many young Floridians are not aware of the economics of continued education and/or do not appreciate the long-range value of complete schooling. It follows that students must be convinced that school experiences are at least as valuable as immediate potential earnings. As a broad recommendation it is suggested that the entire curriculum be re-examined for relevancy to individuals as they become eligible for the job market. The current emphasis toward pre-vocational education in elementary grades, and toward active vocational counseling at the secondary level should be encouraged and strengthened.

Recommendation 6

Data presented in the present investigation and in the previous reports of the Florida Task Force on Disrupted Youth reveal clearly that public school students have educational rights which have not been consistently protected. The rights of minority children to a complete education have been particularly violated. This recommendation, therefore, calls simply for positive legal action in assuring that all children have access to protection against discriminatory enforcement of school administration policy.

Social Service Costs

The costs to Florida of social services directly attributable to undereducation were estimated at $69,636,640 for 1973-74.

Recommendation 7

Having ascertained how many children should be in school, then school leaders should assure that they are there. This means enforcing school attendance laws. Some will object that such laws are unenforceable. The researcher wonders why attendance laws are unenforceable when the **social service programs** resulting from their neglect have been found to bring constitutionally enforceable benefit rights to the non-school attender. It appears that the citizen can selectively choose his law based on benefit, not individual and general good. Again, neither individual citizens nor individual schools should be allowed to make such a choice.

Recommendation 8

The cost of inadequate education in Florida far outstrips the benefits to be gained by the early appearance of early school leavers in the labor market. The educational condition of these workers promises their constant reliance upon the state to provide social services and amenities in disproportionately larger quantities than to their better educated peers. Florida taxpayers can be assured that for every dollar not spent on the inadequately educated youth, many tax dollars will be spent later on social rehabilitation and supportive services. These facts should be an integral part of the planning information on which subsequent funding decisions are made.

Economies of Scale Hypothesis

According to present findings, there are no optimum size/funding arrangements in the State of Florida which experience noticeably increased success in

dealing with school disruption.

Recommendation 9

School disruption appears to be a widespread phenomenon in Florida and in the nation. Yet, reported disruption varies considerably across districts and schools. The apparent failure of the simplistic economy of scale hypothesis should be followed by a series of studies designed to investigate multiple possible correlations (and causes) of school disruption. Funds should be allocated for research proposals which show promise of dealing comparatively with the inner workings of successful *and* unsuccessful programs.

General Recommendations

From the total picture of disruption in public schools, several general recommendations seem warranted.

Recommendation 10

Much of what has been described in this report is unknown to the public. Yet the public owns the schools. It is recommended that "sunshine" laws be strengthened to require public participation in the governance of each school. Recent legislation has required the opening of individual student records to the student and his parents. This trend should be encouraged in all school matters. Selection of key administration officials (e.g., school principals), may be a proper area of public involvement.

Recommendation 11

The right to a public education may be abrogated voluntarily by the student and his parents. One wonders if the use of **in loco parentis** powers by school administrators to remove children from the schools is not an abuse of that power. It is recommended that appropriate legislative bodies review law and regulation which serve as the source for such powers to assure that Florida's professionally trained educators are

clearly guided as to public philosophy, intent, and procedure in such matters.

Recommendation 12

The present focus on disrupted youth suggests a careful look at teacher and administrator **preparation** and **training.** There seem to be very few teacher education programs which systematically prepare teachers and administrators to avoid the use of disruptive discipline and administrative policy. A related suggestion is that schools consider more frequent rotation of some administrators from school to school. The rationale for this suggestion is simply that new personnel may **see** problems which go unnoticed by educators who are **comfortable** in their present positions.

Recommendation 13

This report has not considered the personal and economic effects arising from the probable reduced learning of non-disruptive students who cannot escape a disrupted learning environment. Subsequent studies should examine the **overall** effect of school disruption.

Areas for Further Research

Several questions repeated themselves to the researcher during the study. Beyond the scope of the problem under examination, future consideration of these questions is recommended.

What causes of educational disruption are school-related? Educators should seek to find and remedy their portion of the problem. Do teachers or administrators make the difference in high or low disruption quotients for a school? Is professional preparation of significance? If it is, what particular preparation made the difference?

Next, what is the attitude of the teacher-preparation institutions toward disruption? Is it acknowledged positively in the curriculum? Is education, and the school, looked upon as a process, and a place where the process occurs? Does administrator preparation reflect educational rejection by a significant percent of the potential patronage?

What is the attitude of the various state and regional accrediting agencies toward disruption? If they are merely recorders of physical fact—square feet per student, certificate level per teaching position, and so on, then should they be doing something about education's culls?

Finally, are plans and actions under way at the state agency and school system levels to intervene in this situation? If so, has a realistic method been designed to acquire more accurate data on the number of inadequately educated citizens of school age?

The foregoing are not all-encompassing. They are, however, areas that are basic to an understanding of the problem. Without their resolution, the research described here, and the studies of other aspects of the problem sponsored by the Governor in 1973 and 1974, are but incomplete fragments describing a problem but not assuring its resolution.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ESTIMATED DROPOUT RATE, GRADES 10-12

Year	Withdrawals	Re-entries	Pupils Unaccounted For	Estimated Involuntary Withdrawals	Estimated Voluntary Withdrawals	Estimated Dropout Rate (%)
1964-65	32,711	10,644	22,067	10,506	11,561	4.82
1965-66	33,373	10,259	23,114	10,475	12,639	5.16
1966-67	36,168	11,790	24,378	11,863	12,515	4.90
1967-68	40,110	11,847	28,263	13,762	14,501	5.39
1968-69	42,998	12,721	30,217	14,770	15,507	5.49
1969-70	50,551	15,084	35,467	16,667	18,800	6.31
1970-71	55,072	16,961	38,111	18,394	19,717	6.34
1971-72	63,610	20,844	72,766	19,960	22,806	6.97
1972-73	72,651	22,104	50,547	24,381	26,166	7.63
1973-74	78,007	24,954	53,055	26,094	26,961	7.68

Note: Data from Florida State Department of Education internal annual report *Withdrawals*, 1964-1974. (Unpublished)

FLORIDA DROP-OUT GRADES 10-12 PROJECTION BASED ON 10-YEAR AVERAGE

(1) Year	(2) Number of Dropouts	(3) Deviation	(4) Squared Deviation	(5) (2) x (3)	Graphic Ordinates
1964-65	11,561	−4.5	20.25	−62,024.5	9835.1
1965-66	12,639	−3.5	12.25	−44,236.5	11675.6
1966-67	12,515	−2.5	6.25	−31,287.5	13516.1
1967-68	14,501	−1.5	2.25	−21,751.5	15356.6
1968-69	15,507	− .5	.25	−7753.5	17197.1
—	—	—	0	0	0
1969-70	18,800	.5	.25	9,400.0	18117.3
1970-71	19,717	1.5	2.25	29,575.5	19037.6
1971-72	22,806	2.5	6.25	57,015.0	20878.1
1972-73	26,166	3.5	12.25	91,581.0	22718.6
1973-74	26,961	4.5	20.25	121,324.5	24559.1
	181,173		82.50	151,842.5	
	18117.3 = mean			1,840.5 = annual increment	

Note: Data from Florida State Department of Education internal annual report *Withdrawals*, 1964-1974. (Unpublished)

ENROLLMENT PROJECTION, GRADES 10-12, FLORIDA, BASED ON 10-YEAR AVERAGE

Year	Number Enrolled	Deviation	Squared Deviation	(2) x (3)	Graphic Ordinates
1964-65	239,954	−4.5	20.25	−1079793.0	251485.7
1965-66	245,059	−3.5	12.25	−857706.5	260563.5
1966-67	255,599	−2.5	6.25	−638997.5	269641.3
1967-68	269,255	−1.5	2.25	−403882.5	278719.1
1968-69	282,627	− .5	.25	−141313.5	287796.9
—	—	0	0	0	0
1969-70	298,632	+ .5	.25	149,316.0	296874.7
1970-71	311,191	+1.5	2.25	466,786.5	305952.5
1971-72	327,207	+2.5	6.25	818,017.5	315030.3
1972-73	342,879	+3.5	12.25	857,197.5	324108.1
1973-74	350,955	+4.5	20.25	1,579,297.5	333185.9
10	2,923,358		82.50	748,922.0	
Mean	292335.8	Average Annual Increment: 9077.8			

APPENDIX B

REPORTED EXPENDITURES, SOCIALLY MALADJUSTED STUDENT PROGRAM BUDGET FACTOR, SCHOOL YEAR 1973-1974

School System*	School Direct Costs	District Indirect Costs	School Indirect Costs	Total Costs	FTE's	Per Capita Costs
A	4,390	2,121	286	7,337	4.40	1,667.50
B	8,509	2,080	4,143	14,732	32.39	454.83
C	372,452	29,662	190,113	632,228	341.90	1,849.16
D	24,807	4,042	9,867	38,716	17.85	2,168.96
E	1,803,307	321,892	66,742	2,191,941	529.44	4,140.11
F	30,586	32,101	22,149	134,836	57.50	2,344.97
G	17,982	3,493	4,689	26,164	9.00	2,907.11
H	893	102	227	1,221	1.41	865.96
I	21,441	2,067	2,629	26,137	25.80	1,013.06
J	52,272	14,810	5,065	72,147	43.70	1,650.96
K	8,358	4,226	3,451	16,035	15.35	1,044.63
L	187	207	192	586	10.09	58.08
M	9,149	2,479	4,819	16,447	18.56	886.15
N	6,986	7,513	0	14,499	14.25	1,017.47
O	28,670	6,113	10,028	44,811	10.88	4,118.66
P	17,950	3,198	261	21,409	12.45	1,719.60
Q	2,209	22,421	826	25,456	40.71	625.30
R	94,172	31,867	22,398	148,437	60.61	2,449.05

Appendix B (cont'd)

School System*	School Direct Costs	District Indirect Costs	School Indirect Costs	Total Costs	FTE's	Per Capita Costs
S	1,635	7,415	335	9,359	3.04	3,078.62
T	2,803	62,105	11,572	76,480	147.62	518.09
U	13,759	5,504	0	19,264	14.33	1,344.31
V	14,851	3,227	5,654	23,732	9.00	2,636.89
W	11,016	3,532	2,642	17,190	16.49	1,042.44
X	618	667	214	1,499	.20	7,495.00**
	2,599,542	612,845	368,301	3,580,689	1,436.15	2,493.26

Note: Data taken from School District Superintendents' *Annual Report of Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1974.*

*Twenty-four systems reported expending funds under the Socially Maladjusted Student budget factor. Four Systems reported FTE's under this factor without fund expenditure.

**Projected cost if 1.0 FTE had been reported. Not included in Total.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF INSTRUCTIONAL PROGRAMS FOR THE SOCIALLY MALADJUSTED

A. **Definition**

One who continuously exhibits behaviors that do not meet minimum social standards of conduct required in the regular schools and classrooms; whose behaviors are in defiance of school personnel, disrupts the school program and is antagonistic to other students and to the purpose of the school. (6A-6.301(7) SHER)

B. **Criteria for Eligibility for Special Programs**

Child is eligible if:

1. adjudicated by the court - upon being adjudicated, a delinquent child is remanded to a "detention facility within the school district area:*
2. enrolled in or eligible for enrollment in the public schools of a district:
3. student shows a profile of consistent behavior that results in frequent conflicts of a disruptive nature with other students or staff members:
4. negative behavior is general and not limited to one class, one teacher, or an isolated situation:
5. student exhibits behaviors which persistently interfere with his or her own learning or the education process of others and which requires attention and help beyond that which the basic instructional program can provide:
6. academic progress is unsatisfactory and the effort to provide assistance is rejected or ineffective:
7. student's disturbance is not principally characterized by anxiety and is not necessarily the result of inner conflict but rather he shows faulty character development characterized by inadequate values and a deficit in control of impulses:
8. the student has committed an act of such gravity that retention in the school would be a disrupting influence.

C. **Procedures for Screening, Referral, Identification, Placement, and Dismissal**

1. Screening - A systematic general screening procedure to identify inappropriate student behavior patterns should be adopted by the school district. A "district made" or standardized observational form

*Detention facility - this is not to be interpreted as a Division of Youth Services training school located in a local geographical area.

should be available to all teachers so that it may be used in the screening process. (Inservice training in observation of behavior of students needs to be incorporated into the district plans.) The following outline may help to facilitate the screening process:

a. define the population to be served, providing examples of specific behaviors;
b. select in appropriate observation and rating scale; and
c. provide inservice training to regular school personnel and others on defining the population and observational techniques.

2. Referral - A standard referral system should be established in each district to insure every student an appropriate diagnosis regarding an identified problem. A referral may be made by the parents, physician, community agency (Division of Youth Services), school personnel, independently or as a result of the district's systematic screening procedures. All information related to the student at the time of referral should be made available with the specific reason for the referral being identified by the referral source.

3. Identification - The identification procedures must be consistent with the eligibility criteria and provide documentation sufficient for a program audit.

a. comprehensive physical examination which includes a vision and hearing test
b. a compilation of specific behavioral data that supports the contention that there are frequent conflicts of a disruptive nature with other students or school personnel; this should include information gathered not only from the referral source but also from other sources that help to back up the initial referral data [a behavioral rating form should be adopted or developed by the school system to help in gathering the information]
c. evidence of previous adjustments to the student's educational program such as:
    1. change in student's schedule;
    2. change in class or teacher assignments;
    3. counseling, both group and individual;
    4. parent conferences;
d. determination of intellectual capacity (i.e. Stanford Binet, Wechsler Intelligence Scale)
e. self report - one self report measure of the student's self concept such as the PPP School Sentence Form, the Self Appraisal Inventory, or others
f. educational assessments to determine academic strengths and weaknesses

g. evidence that a social history has been collected directly from the parents or guardians (preferably at the site of residence)

4. Placement - All available data (referral, screening, identification) relevant to making recommendations for educational programming should be gathered and presented to the staffing committee. The purpose of staffing is to insure the appropriate educational program for the child. Therefore, concerned persons who have pertinent information relevant to the child should be included in the staffing to study and evaluate all available data. Among those who should be included are: the referring teacher, referring principal, psychologist, school social worker, receiving teacher, receiving principal, community agency personnel, parents and a representative from the exceptional child education department who chairs the staffing committee.

   Educational placement alternatives although varying from district to district, could include the following:

   a. self-contained class in special school;
   b. self-contained class in regular school;
   c. resource room in regular school;
   d. basic education class with counseling.

   All recommendations for placement should be accompanied by an educational plan based on the data derived from the identification procedures.

5. Dismissal - Observable progress in modifying or eliminating the entering behaviors in a positive fashion should be the major indication of readiness to return to the basic educational program. A system of reassignment of the student back to the regular school program should be established. This should be a systematic process whereby an assessment of the student's ability to re-enter is observed and validated. Dismissal may be in the form of a transitional phase (i.e. self-contained placement to resource program).

D. **Instructional Program**

1. Program Objectives, Curriculum, and Organization

   An exceptional child program which offers one method for all identified children is as suspect as the regular program that demands all children learn from the same lesson at the same time.

   A complete solution can come about in a variety of ways but with our present insights and resources it is still essential that a youth have some training or education development to be considered a contributing member of society.

A new approach is required if education is to be meaningful to him. This approach must be student-centered. [It must evolve from the situations students, themselves, create (those in which they express interests).] It must be viable, flexible and fluid. It must offer more than one form of administrative arrangement for meeting of the needs of socially maladjusted children. It must be a team effort of school personnel including general education, exceptional child education, vocational education, and pupil personnel services--all must be willing to cooperate and work together on behalf of the socially maladjusted youngster, plus other community agencies. An educational program without this team work will be ineffective and lacking.

The continum of administrative arrangements would include the following:

a. A self-contained classroom or separate program--A classroom for the socially maladjusted should not be a "dumping ground." The purpose of the separate program should be to provide educational programs, behavioral management and group interaction analysis for those students who cannot presently profit from regular class placement. The goal is to return them to the regular stream of education as soon as possible.

b. Resource room or part-time classroom in regular school--The resource teacher is responsible for translating the psycho-educational evaluation findings into appropriate educational and behavioral management objectives and the planning, implementation and evaluation of the appropriate instructional procedures. These would include basic skill needs and the therapeutic management of social maladjustment behaviors. A teacher who is available to provide direct services to children, available for constant consultation and communication with regular classroom teachers and principals regarding the student's specific needs and recommendations of materials, instructional procedures, information for parent conferences, and utilization of community agencies.

c. Consultative teacher--The consultative teacher, should be responsible for consultation and communication with regular classroom teachers and principals in terms of dealing with individual or group problems regarding specific needs, materials, instructional procedures and behavioral management. The teacher should serve as the liaison between the school and community agencies. The major responsibility for the total curriculum planning of the student's school life remains with the regular instructional program.

Relationship of Severity of Maladjustment to Educational Needs

Self-contained classroom or separate program	Resource room in regular school	Consultative teacher to work with regular class teachers	Full-time in regular classroom
Education Team: **Exceptional Child Education** **Vocational Education** **Pupil Personnel Services**	Education Team: **Exceptional Child Education** **General Education** **Vocational Education** **Pupil Personnel Services**	Education Team: **Exceptional Child Education** **General Education** **Vocational Education** **Pupil Personnel Services**	Education Team: **General Education** **Vocational Education** **Pupil Personnel Services**
Student enrolled in Exceptional Child Education	Student enrolled in Exceptional Child Education with fusion in General Education	Student enrolled in General Education	Student enrolled in General Education

It must be remembered, however, that a child will be provided a program *only* when specific objectives stating his precise needs are developed and a specialized program designed that specific selected procedures, content, and methods relevant to the identified objectives. Measurement or evaluation of the student's performance would be in accordance with the objectives developed for each child.

Some of the characteristics necessary in a program for the socially maladjusted include the following:

- the relaxation of academic pressure;
- individualized and flexible instructional programs;
- the centering of the program in activities rather than in textbooks;
- a sufficient variety of course offerings to meet the needs of all types of students;
- stress upon remedial work in the basic learning skills;
- elasticity in the application of a minimum number of rules and regulations in a relaxed and permissive environment;
- an intensive but informal guidance progress stressing the uniqueness of each personality and its problems and adjustment to home, employment and society as well as to the school; and
- a staff carefully selected for their interest in students as persons.

2. Student Assessment

Once a student is accepted into a program, there should be a periodic diagnosis of the student in terms of capability, performance, and motivation. The results, of course, would have a bearing upon lessons and program evaluations. Examples of diagnostic and assessment techniques are:

a. individualized conference, counseling, and tutoring;
b. group counseling;
c. rap sessions, peer counseling and magic circle;
d. psychological tests, examinations and inventories;
e. sociograms;
f. systematic reporting for students, parents and school personnel.

E. **Facilities**

Facilities for programs for socially maladjusted children should meet accreditation standards 9.661 - 9.663.

F. **Transportation**

Transportation becomes an important consideration in planning the type of program to be provided as well as the location of the education facility in which the program is to be housed.

Travel monies should be provided for itinerant teachers of socially maladjusted children.

G. **Program Personnel**

The statements below are presented as guidelines to assist in the selection and placement of teachers to work with the socially maladjusted. The teacher of the socially maladjusted should:

1. have a knowledge of behavioral and academic characteristics of socially maladjusted children;
2. have a knowledge of educational strategies utilized with maladjusted children, the theoretical rationale underlying the various strategies and be able to describe and defend a personal orientation;
3. have a knowledge of realistic alternatives in the management of maladjusted behavior;
4. have a knowledge of materials and approaches to be utilized in teaching reading, mathematics, social skills, vocations and other school subjects;
5. have a knowledge of how to individualize instruction within a group setting;
6. have a knowledge of general policies regarding referral, placement, and

dismissal procedures for socially maladjusted children;

7. have a knowledge of behavioral and academic assessment instruments and how these instruments may be utilized in educational planning and programming;
8. have a knowledge of state and federal laws which govern provisions for socially maladjusted children;
9. have skills necessary to develop understanding of children's problems between parents and school related personnel.

Designing effective inservice program calls for considerable creative planning, yet this is a crucial dimension of developing and improving programs. Inservice education designed for professional growth will make significant contributions to all those involved in the education process.

H. Program Evaluation

The overall effectiveness of this program lies in what it does for participating students which would not be accomplished if these programs and services did not exist.

Several means will be used to measure the overall effectiveness of the program.

1. Since most students involved with this program will be among the group of students most likely to drop out of the traditional school program, a factor of predictability can be determined by comparisons between predictability of being a dropout and actual dropout figures.
2. Attendance data from each student's past record can be obtained and compared to attendance records of the student following admissions to the program.
3. Based upon the student's previous record of disciplinary actions, a predictable number of disciplinary actions can be developed for each individual student participant. This prediction will be compared to the number of disciplinary actions following admission to the program.
4. Locally developed attitudinal instruments and instruments on the market for purchase can be used to collect information on the attitudes of students toward themselves and education in general. Pre and post measurements can be used to provide comparative data.

   Attitudinal instruments can be used to collect information on attitudes toward the community and social awareness in the community.

Evaluation procedures may include written assessments by staff, children, and agencies relating to program effectiveness; tabulations of children enrolled and withdrawn to regular class programs; indications of greatly modified behavior as versus behavior noted upon admission; and improved scores on standardized achievement tests and self concept scales.

APPENDIX C

Studied Florida Secondary Schools by Mean Size, Student per Capita, Dollar Expenditures, and Student Disruption Averages

Size Range	N	Mean Size	*Expenditures (Input)*				*Disruption (Output)*		
			Total Instruction	School Direct	*Indirect* School	*Indirect* District	*Students (%)* Retained	*Students (%)* Suspended	Mean Days Suspended
Below 800	19	583	$744	$467	$120	$113	03	11	5.7
800 – 1199	51	1010	725	410	178	125	03	14	7.4
1200 – 1599	37	1378	696	390	115	125	03	12	7.7
1600 – 2399	60	1960	746	414	185	132	04	12	6.7
2400 or more	35	2936	743	425	180	123	04	8	6.5

Note: From *Research Report No. 117* (Tallahassee, 1974) and internal records of the Bureau of Planning and Bureau of Financial Management Services, Division of Public Schools, Department of Education, Tallahassee, Florida.

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ERRATA

Apologies must be extended to the reader for several inadvertant typographical errors that appear in this report. It should be noted at this time that these errors were strictly transcription errors which occurred in the preparation of this final report from the original, extensive working document of the project staff. They are, therefore, ex post facto errors and do not, in any way, impact on the analysis, conclusions, or recommendations presented in this document.

The first of these errors appears in the final sentence of page 4, in which the school year cited should read 1970-71. The accuracy of this correction can be determined by following this cohort through their expected graduation at the end of school year 1973-74, the procedure addressed on page 5 of this report.

The second error appears on page 12, in the Outline of Results. The dollar cost of suspensions and retentions have been reversed, with Retentions having produced the estimated loss of 36.1 million dollars and Suspensions being attributed with the substantially lower cost figure 1.8 million dollars--findings which are clarified by the discussions on the following two pages.

A third error appears on page 13, where the number of expulsions in Florida during 1973-74 should read 612. This figure appears in its correct form in Table 1 and is the figure upon which all further calculations were based.

The final error is found on line one of page 16, where the correct figure should be $54,100,740. The accuracy of this figure may be borne out by computing the private benefit of early school leaving as suggested in that section, which will then allow you to arrive at the same conclusion ($47,766,900) as was reached in this report.